Abstract. The International Obfuscated C Code Contest was a programming contest for the most creatively obfuscated yet succinct C code. By contrast, an interest herein is in programs which are, in a sense, easily seen to be correct, but which cannot be proved correct in pre-assigned, computably axiomatized, powerful, true theories T. A point made by our first theorem, then, is that, then, unverifiable programs need not be obfuscated!
Introduction
The International Obfuscated C Code Contest (see the Wikipedia entry) was a programming contest for the most creatively obfuscated C code, held annually between 1984 and 1996, and thereafter in 1998, 2000, 2001, 2004 , and 2006.
1.1.
Complexity-Bounded Computability. Let ϕ TM be the efficiently laid out and Gödel-numbered acceptable programming system (numbering) from [28, Chapter 3 & Errata] and which is based on deterministic multi-tape Turing Machines (with base two I/O). 1 Its programs are named by all the numbers in N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. ϕ TM p is the partial computable function N → N computed by ϕ TM -program (number) p. The numerical naming just mentioned does not feature prime powers and factorization, but, instead, is a lineartime computable and invertible coding. Let Φ TM be the corresponding step-counting Blum Complexity Measure [1] . (ϕ TM , Φ TM ) is a base model for deterministic run time costs. ϕ TM 's superscript is awkward when ϕ TM is employed in subscripts, so, from this point on, we will write ϕ TM as simply ϕ.
Herein, we will use the linear-time computable and invertible pairing function ·, · from [28] : the binary representation of x, y is (by definition) an interleaving of the binary representations of x and y where we alternate x's and y's digits and start on the right with the least most significant y digit. For example, 15, 2 = 94 -since 15 = 1111 (binary), 2 = 0010 (binary), and 94 = 10101110 (binary). This function, clearly then, maps all the pairs of elements of N 1-1, onto N. We also employ this notation, based on iterating, ·, · , as in [28] , to code also triples, quadruples, . . . of elements of N 1-1, onto N: for all n > 2, and all x 1 , . . . , x n + 1, x 1 , . . . , x n + 1 = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n + 1 . These functions also clearly satisfy the following Lemma 1.1.
(1) x 1 , . . . , x n is odd implies x n is odd; (2) λx 1 , . . . , x n x 1 , . . . , x n is monotonically increasing in each of its arguments; and, (3) for all x 1 , . . . , x n , max(x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≤ x 1 , . . . , x n .
For example, in the proof of Theorem 2.21 below, the just above lemma will see explicit and implicit application.
LinearTime is the class of functions: N → N each computable by some ϕ-program running within a Φ TM -time bound linear in the length of its base-two expressed argument. Of course by means of the iterated ·, · function defined just above, we can and sometimes will speak of multi-argument functions as being (or not being) in LinearTime.
For k ∈ N, k could be a numerically named program of ϕ or just a datum. We let |k| = the length of k, where k is written in binary. We can write this length as (⌈log 2 (k + 1)⌉) + , where (·) + turns 0 into 1; else, leaves unchanged. 2 1 In general, the acceptable programming systems [24, 25, 18, 22, 23, 27] can be characterized as those programming systems for all the 1-argument partial computable functions: N → N which are inter-compilable with the natural system ϕ TM . Rogers [24, 25] characterized the acceptable systems as those with universality and for which Kleene's S-m-n holds. This latter is more than enough to get (not necessarily efficient) recursion theorems in acceptable systems. 2 This formula can be derived as the minimum number of whole bits needed to store any one of the k + 1 things 0 through k, except that the case of k = 0 needs only 0 bits; however, a single 0 has length 1. This and more general use of (·)+ also helps to deal with the fact that zero values can cause trouble for O-notation (O-notation is explained in [8] ). A problem comes with complexity bounds of more than one argument. Jim Royer gave the following example of two functions mapping pairs from N, f (m, n) = (m · n) & g(m, n) = (m + 1) · (n + 1). Suppose, as might be expected, g is O(f ). Then there are positive a, b such that, for each m, n ∈ N, g(m, n) ≤ a · f (m, n) + b. Then we have, for each n, n + 1
Rogers [25] uses the terms 'converges' for computations which halt and provide output and 'diverges' for those that do not. Herein we use the respective notations (due to Albert Meyer) ↓ and ↑ in place of those terms of Rogers. From [28, Lemma 3.14] , there are small positive a ∈ N and function if-then-else ∈ LinearTime such that, for all p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , x ∈ N,
Essentially from (the k, m = 1 case of) [ There are small positive b ∈ N and function krt ∈ LinearTime such that, for all parameter values p, tasks r, inputs x ∈ N:
Intuitively, above in (1.3), on the left-hand side, the ϕ-program krt(p, r) has p, r stored inside, and, on x, it: makes a self-copy (in linear-time), forms y = self-copy, p, x (in linear-time), and runs task r on this y. From (1.4) just above, for each p, r, any superlinear cost of running ϕ-program krt(p, r) on its input is from the running of ϕ-task r on its linear-time producible input.
1.2.
Computably Axiomatized, Powerful, True Theories. Let T be a computably axiomatized first order (fo) theory extending fo Peano arithmetic (PA) [20, 25] -but with numerals represented in base two to avoid size blow up from unary representation (see [3, Page 29]) 3 -and which does not prove (standard model for PA [20] ) falsehoods expressible in f.o. arithmetic. 3 Lets suppose 0 is PA's numeral for zero and that S is PA's symbol for the successor function on N.
In effect, in, e.g., [20] , the numeral n for natural number n is S (n) (0), where S (0) (0) = 0 and S (n+1) (0) = S(S (n) (0)) -featuring iterated composition of Ss. This is a base one representation. Note that the length of this n is O(n) which is O of 2 the symbol length of n -too high for feasible complexity. However, the symbol length for the binary representation of n grows only linearly with n -feasibly. Based on [3, Page 29] , herein, by constrast with the just above, we can define our numeral n for n ∈ N thus. We suppose · is the symbol for PA's multiplication over N. We let: 2 = S•S(0); for (n > 1), n ∈ N, 2n = (2 · n);
( 1.5) and, for n ∈ N, (2n) + 1 = S(2n).
(1.6) Then, the length of n is in O of the symbol length of n -feasible.
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T could be, for example: fo Peano arithmetic (PA) itself, the two-sorted fo Peano arithmetic permitting quantifiers over numbers and sets of numbers [25, 29] (a second order arithmetic), Zermelo Frankel Set Theory with Choice (ZFC) [13] , ZFC + ones favorite large cardinal axiom [26, 14, 9, 15] , etc.
If E is an expression such as 'the partial function computed by ϕ-program number p is total' and which is expressible in PA and where p is a particular element of N, we shall write ≪ E ≫ to denote a typically naturally corresponding, fixed standard cwff (closed wellformed formula) of T which (semantically) expresses E -and where p is expressed as the corresponding numeral in base two (as indicated above). We have that if E ′ is obtained from E by substituting a numerical value k, then ≪ E ′ ≫ can be algorithmically obtained from ≪ E ≫ in linear-time in (|≪ E ≫|+ |k|).
By [28, Theorem 3.6 & Corollary 3.7] and their proofs, the running of a carefully crafted, time-bounded, ϕ-universal simulation up through time t takes time a little worse than exponential in |t|. Early complexity theory, e.g., [2, 17, 16] , provided delaying tricks to achieve polynomial time. From [28, Theorem 3.20] and its proof, the above mentioned carefully crafted, time-bounded universal simulation of any ϕ-program can be uniformly delayed by a log log factor on the time-bound to run in LinearTime.
The theorems of T form a computably enumerable set, so we can/do fix a predicate logic complete automatic theorem prover (such as resolution) for T. This theorem prover can be time-bounded universally simulated -but, as in the just prior paragraph, that simulation can be delayed by a log log factor on the time-bound to, then, run in LinearTime. Let
mean that a delayed by such a log log factor, linear-time computable, time-bounded universal simulation of the fixed automatic theorem prover proves ≪ E ≫ from T within x stepsthat's linear-time in (|≪ E ≫|+ |x|).
Let D x be the finite set (⊆ N) with canonical index x (see, e.g., [25] ). x codes, for example, both how to list D x and how to know when the listing is done. Herein, we can and do restrict our canonical indexing of finite sets to those of sets cardinality ≤ 2. We do that in linear-time thus. Let 0 be the code of ∅, and, for set {u, u + v}, let the code be u, v + 1. This coding (suggested by a referee to replace our original one) is linear-time codable/decodable (and is 1-1, and, unlike our original, is onto). 4 
Results
2.1.
Non-Obfuscated Unprovable Programs. Theorem 2.1. There exists g ∈ LinearTime and small positive c, d ∈ N such that, for any p, |D g(p) | = 2 and there is a q ∈ D g(p) for which:
3)
Our proof below of Theorem 2.1, as will be seen, makes it easily transparent that ϕ q = ϕ p . Hence, q is not obfuscated, yet its correctness (at computing ϕ p ), as will also be seen, is unprovable in T. From the time and program size complexity content of the theorem, q is nicely only slightly, linearly more complex than p. Furthermore, our proof is what is called in [28, Page 131] a rubber wall argument: we set up a rubber wall, i.e., a potential contradiction off of which to bounce, so that, were the resultant construction to veer into satisfaction of an undesired condition (undesired here is the failure of (2.4) above), it bounces off the rubber wall (i.e., contradiction) toward our goal, here (2.4), instead.
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Proof of Theorem 2. 1 .
By two applications of linear-time: krt, if-then-else (these from Section 1.1 above), and λE, x (T ⊢ x E) (this from Section 1.2 above), from any ϕ-program p, one can algorithmically find in linear-time (in |p|), programs e 1,p and e 2,p behaving as follows.
For each x,
and
Let g ∈ LinearTime be such that, for each p, D g(p) = {e 1,p , e 2,p }. We consider cases regarding p for the choice of the associated q ∈ D g(p) .
Case (1). domain(ϕ p ) is infinite. Suppose for contradiction, for some x, T ⊢ x ≪ ϕ e 1,p = ϕ p ≫. Since, by assumption, T does not prove false such sentences, ϕ e 1,p = ϕ p , and by (2.5) above, for all x ′ ≥ x, ϕ e 1,p (x ′ ) also = ϕ p (x ′ ) + 1, but, since domain(ϕ p ) is infinite, we have a contradiction. Choose q = e 1,p . Then, trivially, again by (2.5), ϕ q = ϕ p , but T does not prove it.
Case (2). domain(ϕ p ) is finite. Suppose for contradiction, for some x, T ⊢ x ≪ ϕ e 2,p = ϕ p ≫. Since, by assumption, T does not prove false such sentences, ϕ e 2,p = ϕ p , and by (2.6) above, for all x ′ ≥ x, ϕ e 2,p (x ′ ) also = 0, making domain(ϕ e 2,p ) infinite, and, hence, domain(ϕ p ) is infinite, a contradiction. Choose q = e 2,p . Then, trivially, again by (2.6), ϕ q = ϕ p , but T does not prove it.
In each case, by if-then-else and krt being linear-time (hence, at most linear growth) functions, λE, x (T ⊢ x E) ∈ LinearTime, and by the complexity upper bounds (1.2) and (1.4) (in Section 1.1 above) as well as the assertion (in Section 1.2 above) of the lineartime (and, hence, linear size) cost of substituting numerals into formulas of PA, we have small positive c, d such that the theorem's time complexity bound (2.2) and it's program size bound (2.3) above each hold.
Theorem 2.1
Next is the promised, motivated, concrete example.
Putnam [21] notes that the typical inductive definitions of grammaticality (i.e., wellformedness) for propositional logic formulas parallel the typical definitions of truth (under any truth-value assignment to the propositional variables) for such formulas, and that the first kind of inductive definition provides a short and feasible decision program for grammaticality. 6 He goes on to say, though, that the other ways of providing short and feasible inductive definitions of such grammaticality which also parallel an inductive definition of truth are so similar as to constitute intrinsic grammars (and semantics). Let p be one of these typical short and fast decision procedures for propositional calculus grammaticality expressed naturally and directly as a ϕ-program. Then by Theorem 2.1 above and its proof also above, there is an obviously semantically equivalent ϕ-program q only slightly linearly more complex than p in size and run time (so it too is short and feasible); q also provides the same inductive definition of grammaticality as p which, then, parallels the truth definition like p does (after all the else part of q is p and the if-part of q never comes true); but the unprovability (in pre-assigned T) of the semantic equivalence of q with p makes q a bit peculiar as an intrinsic grammar for propositional logic, providing a basis to doubt Putnam's assertion. However, we do note that intensionally [25] q is a bit unlike p -since it performs an always false (quick) test p doesn't.
2.2.
A Constructivity Concern. It's interesting to ask: can the condition |D g(p) | = 2 in Theorem 2.1 be improved to |D g(p) | = 1? If so, it makes sense to replace a singleton set, {q}, by just q and use g(p) = q (not the code of {q}). Anyhow, the answer to the question is, No (see Theorem 2.3 below). Before we present and prove this theorem, it is useful to have for its proof the unsurprising lemma (Lemma 2.2) just below.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. The relation, in p, x, y, t, that holds iff ϕ p (x)↓ = y within t steps, where the steps are measured by the natural Φ TM , is trivially computable (a.k.a. recursive) [1] . Suppose ϕ p (x)↓ = y. Then there is some t such that ϕ p (x)↓ = y within t steps. By Gödel's Lemma [12, 20] that recursive relations are numeralwise provably-representable in, e.g., PA, PA ⊢ ≪ ϕ p (x)↓ = y within t steps ≫. By existential generalization inside PA,
The next theorem implies that, in Theorem 2.1 above, the condition |D g(p) | = 2 cannot be improved to |D g(p) | = 1 (or equivalent as discussed above). The proof of this next theorem (Theorem 2.3) provides positive cases regarding proving true program properties in PA. Theorem 2.3. It is not the case that there exists computable g such that, for any p, for
] is partially computable, and, importantly, this is provable in PA. We sketch how we know the provability in PA.
For example, one step in showing the provability is to explicitly construct a ϕ universal program u so that its detailed correctness is (trivially, albeit tediously) provable in PA. In particular,
(2.9) For ϕ, the construction of a relatively efficient, but time-bounded variant of such a u is outlined in the proof of [28, Theorem 3.6 ]. This construction can be altered to remove the time-boundedness and just get a suitable u.
Another step would be to spell out a ϕ-program c for a computable function comp 2 for computing a ϕ-program for the composition of the partial functions computed by its ϕ-program arguments as in the m = 2 case of [28, Lemma 3.10] 8 and its proof -where, again, PA proves correctness (including comp 2 = ϕ c is total).
Relevance of u and c: clearly we have, 11) and the right-hand side of (2.11) just above is a relevant composition and, then, can be further expanded employing c. 9 With u and c, then, we can explicitly compute a ϕ-program for λp, x [ϕ ϕ d (p) (x)] and prove it correct in PA.
So, then, by the Constructive Kleene's Second Recursion Theorem but without the parameter p as above in Section 1.1 above, we have a (self-referential) p 0 such that, for any x,
(2.12) Below we'll refer to this parameter-free version of the above Constructive Kleene Theorem as KRT. Then we have a ϕ-program k for the above function krt again with parameter p completely omitted, and, with this k representing in the language of PA this modified version of the function krt, KRT is completely provable in PA.
Hence, by our remarks above about computing and proving correct a program for λp, x [ϕ ϕ d (p) (x)], we can explicitly compute a p 0 as in (2.12) and prove it correct in PA; we have in particular,
13) However, we don't know enough about g (and d) to know whether we can prove g's totality in PA -including by representing g as ϕ d ; fortunately, we won't need that.
We do know (at least outside PA) that g is total (since it's a consequence of g's assumed computability). Hence, we know (at least outside PA) that g(p 0 )↓. Since, from above, d is a ϕ-program for g, we have that ϕ d (p 0 )↓ = to some explicit numerical value q 0 . Therefore, from Lemma 2.2 above,
Hence, by substitution of equals for equals and reflexivity of equals inside PA, (2.13), and (2.14), 4 ) which provides such a ψ, but we didn't, then, know whether our ψ was acceptable. We subsequently obtained Theorem 2.4's furthermore clause providing our ψ's acceptability together with a surprise we didn't expect. We explain the surprise after the statement of Theorem 2.4 and before its proof.
Theorem 2. 4 . There is a programming system ψ and a computable g such that, for all p,
Furthermore, ψ is acceptable, and, surprisingly,
How can (2.16) be true -in the light of the rest of the just above theorem (Theorem 2.4)? It seems to contradict Theorem 2.3 further above. The answer is that, in the proof just below of the just above theorem (Theorem 2.4), the needed ψ is, in effect, defined by an unusual ϕ-program e in (2.19, 2.20) below, and, in the language of PA, for formulating (un)provability about ψ in T, ψ is, of course, represented by its defining e. 10 ϕ itself, on the other hand, can be and is understood to be naturally (not unusually) represented in the language of PA.
11
To aid us in some proofs below, including that of the above Theorem 2.4, we present the following lemma (Lemma 2.5), where the recursion theorem part of its proof is from H. Friedman [11] .
Lemma 2.5 (T-Provable Padding-Once). Suppose α is any acceptable programming system such that T proves α's acceptability.
Then, there is a total computable function g such that for any p, g(p) = p, but α g(p) = α p .
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Furthermore, this padding-once result is, then, expressible and provable in T.
Proof of Lemma 2.5. Assume the hypothesis, i.e., that T proves α's acceptability.
Then T proves Kleene's S-m-n Theorem, so we obtain that T proves the Parameterized Second Kleene Recursion Theorem (as above in Section 1.1, but with witnessing functions not necessarily in LinearTime).
Then, from this Kleene Theorem, we have a computable function f such that, for each p, x,
Then, let g be defined as follows.
We consider two cases.
By this case-analysis, g satisfies Padding-Once. The above is so simple as to be provable in T -as needed.
Lemma 2.5
Proof of Theorem 2. 4 . By Kleene's second recursion theorem (again without parameter), there is a (self-referential) ϕ-program e and an associated ψ both such that, for each p, x, 
For the next three corollaries (Corollaries 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11), the mentioned ψ is that from Theorem 2.4 and its proof, including (2.19, 2.20) above.
Proof of Corollary 2.9. ψ = ϕ is from Theorem 2.4 above. Suppose for contradiction
Then, from this and the proof of Theorem 2.3 above, one obtains a Theorem 2.3 but with ψ replacing ϕ. This contradicts Theorem 2.4 above (which is also about ψ).
Corollary 2.9
To understand the corollary (Corollary 2.10) and its proof just below, it may be useful to review the roles of ϕ-programs u, c, k in the proof of Theorem 2.3 above. This corollary says there can be no analog of all three of these programs for ψ (in place of ϕ). Regarding Corollary 2.10 just above, it is well known that, from [18, 19] , Kleene's S-m-n can be constructed out of a program c for composition and, then, Kleene's proof of KRT can be done from S-m-n; so, it might appear that (2.23) just above could be eliminated. This is actually open. The reason is that, while each of these just mentioned constructions requires some easily existing auxiliary ψ-programs, for Corollary 2.10 we'd ostensibly also need these auxiliary ψ-programs to be T-provably correct.
14 The T-provable correctness is the hard part.
Corollary 2.11. T ⊢ ≪ ψ is acceptable≫. 13 This composition is the m = 2 case of [28, Lemma 3.10] (see Footnote 8 further above). 14 Machtey and Young's construction [18, 19] of an S-m-n function out of a composition function, for example, employs auxiliary ψ-programs q0, q1 such that ψq 0 = λz 0, z ; and ψq 1 = λ y, z y + 1, z .
(2.24)
Marcoux's more efficient solution [19] employs three such auxiliary ψ-programs.
Proof of Corollary 2.11. Assume for contradiction otherwise. Then, by Lemma 2.5 above,
From this we have, T ⊢ ≪ (∃q, r | q = r)[ψ q = ψ r ] ≫, a contradiction to Claim 2.6 above.
Corollary 2.11 2.3.1. Subtleties About Proving Universality. The next two theorems herein (Theorems 2.12 and 2.18) provide two more acceptable programming systems, η, θ, respectively, each defined (as was ψ above) by respective, unusual ϕ-programs. The first of these theorems (Theorem 2.12) provides a surprise, part positive, part negative, regarding proving in T that universality holds for η. The contrast between these last two theorems is also interesting. Of course, since each of η, θ is acceptable, universality holds for each of them (at least outside T). Below, for partial functions ξ, ρ(ξ) denotes the range of ξ.
Theorem 2.12.
There exists an acceptable programming system η and an e such that PA ⊢ ≪ e is universal for η ≫, yet, surprisingly, for each p,
25)
Of course, in η, there are infinitely many universal programs, but exactly one provably so in T. Furthermore, η turns out to be ϕ.
Proof of Theorem 2.12. The Kleene Second Recursion Theorem provides a ϕ-program e and an associated η both such that, for each p, x,
Of course, since KRT for ϕ is constructively provable in PA, we can get the numeral for e inside PA as well as the universally quantified equation just above for the value of ϕ e ( p, x ) by cases.
Proof of Claim 2. 13 . Assume for contradiction that Then, for f (p) = ϕ e ( p, x 0 ), ρ(f ) ⊇ (N − {e}). Clearly, η e = ϕ e , and η e has infinite range. Furthermore, (∀p = e)(∀x ≥ x 0 )[η p (x) = p]; therefore, (∀p = e)[η p has finite range], and, thus, there is no η-program whose code number is not e whose computed partial function is equal to η e . Furthermore, (∀p, 
Claim 2.14 Claim 2. 15 . There does not exist p, q such that p = q, and T ⊢ ≪ η p = η q ≫.
Proof of Claim 2. 15 . Suppose for contradiction otherwise. Then, by Gödel's Lemma followed by existential generalization, the latter in T, we obtain a contradiction to Claim 2. 13 .
Claim 2.15
Claim 2. 16 . PA ⊢ ≪ e is universal for η ≫.
Proof of Claim 2. 16 . We need not prove in PA that η is a programming system for the 1-argument partial computable functions. Instead, it suffices for us to argue only that
Then, from (2.26) above, the definition of η by e in the ϕ-system, applied to each side of (2.30), it, then, suffices to show that Theorem 2. 18 . There exists an acceptable programming system θ such that, for each u,
Of course, in θ, there are infinitely many universal programs, but none are provably so in T. Furthermore, θ turns out to be ϕ.
Proof of Theorem 2.18. Kleene's Recursion Theorem provides a ϕ-program e and an associated θ both such that, for each p, x,
(2.34)
Assume for contradiction that T ⊢ ≪ (∃u)[u is universal in θ] ≫. Then, since T does not prove false things of this sort, universality holds in θ. Let x 0 be the smallest number of steps in any proof as is assumed just above to exist.
Then there is no p such that ρ(θ p ) = ρ(θ); therefore, there cannot be any universal programs for θ, a contradiction.
Therefore, T ⊢ ≪ (∃u)[u is universal in θ] ≫, and, thus, (∀p, x)[θ p (x) = ϕ p (x)]. This makes θ acceptable.
Furthermore, it is not the case that (∃u)[T ⊢ ≪ u is universal in θ ≫], since, if T proved such a thing, it would immediately follow from Existential Generalization in T that ≪ (∃u)[u is universal in θ] ≫ is provable in T, which has already been shown not to be provable by T.
Theorem 2.18
We expect that analogs of Theorems 2.12 and 2.18 just above can be obtained for other properties besides universality. In the next section we have an analog for composition.
Provable Composition with Unprovable Program Equivalence.
The main result of this section (Theorem 2.21 below): there is an acceptable programming system (equivalent to ϕ) such that T can prove there exists a specific program which witnesses composition in that system, but T is still unable to prove that there exist two distinct, equivalent programs in that system. It is the last and hardest to prove result in the present paper.
In the proof of this theorem, we require provable in PA infinite padding for just the ϕ-system -a stronger form of padding than provided by Lemma 2.5, though this infinite padding function is only valid for ϕ, and thus would not have been usable for Corollary 2.11. As such, we introduce the following function pad, which uses the concepts from [28, Chapter 3 but as modified in the associated Errata] of normal and abnormal code numbers of ϕ-programs. Herein we briefly discuss these concepts. A program in the ϕ-system is defined as a non-empty sequence of instructions for a k-tape Turing machine, where all these instructions have the same k. If a given number is not directly the code for such a sequence, it is defined to be an abnormal code; otherwise, it is a normal code. The process of checking a given number to see if it is normal or abnormal is computable. 15 By convention, abnormal codes are treated as each encoding the same Turing machine, and thus all compute the same function. It is a consequence of the encoding used for the ϕ-system that all normal codes are divisible by eight; thus, there are infinitely many even abnormal codes -for instance, anything divisible by two but not eight is an even abnormal code. Proof of Claim 2. 19 . As above, determining whether a given number is a normal code is algorithmic. Furthermore, as there are infinitely many even abnormal codes, finding the next such is straightforward. Thus, the first clause in the definition of pad is computably checkable and, if true, pad outputs an even number greater than the input, such that both are abnormal codes. As noted above, each abnormal code is defined (for the ϕ-system) to compute the same function as each other abnormal code, and, hence, the part of the claim not about PA holds for such p.
If the second clause holds, then converting p into a coded sequence of instructions is simple, repeating the last instruction is also simple, and converting that sequence back into a code number is once again simple. By [28] , when there are multiple instructions that apply in a given state, the first one is the one that applies, thus repeating an instruction can have no impact on the (possibly partial) function computed by a ϕ program; thus, ϕ pad(p) = ϕ p in this case. Furthermore, as noted above, all normal instruction codes must be even; thus, pad(p) is even in this case as well.
Therefore, the part of the claim not about PA holds. The proof so far is so simple that it can be carried out in PA straightforwardly albeit tediously. Then there are e 1 , . . . , e n , c such that ϕ c is total, and, for each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for all x, y, ϕ e i (y) = ξ i (e 1 , . . . , e n , c, y), (2.36) and ϕ ϕc(x) (y) = ξ(e 1 , . . . , e n , c, x, y).
In Lemma 2.20 just above, (2.36) expresses the n-ary Kleene Recursion Theorem part, and (2.37) expresses the Delayed Recursion Theorem part.
Theorem 2. 21 . There is an acceptable programming system ζ and a w such that PA ⊢ ≪ w is a witness to composition in ζ ≫, yet T ⊢ ≪ (∃r, t = r)[ζ r = ζ t ] ≫. Furthermore, ζ turns out to be ϕ.
Proof of Theorem 2. 21 . We apply the n = 3 case of Lemma 2.20 just above to obtain programs e, c, w ′ , w behaving as below in (2.39, 2.40, 2.41, 2.42), respectively. 17 The ζ we need for the theorem is defined in terms of this e thus. For each p, x,
(2.38)
For convenience below, in describing the behavior of e, c, w ′ , w, in many places we'll write this ζ instead of ϕ e . In the following formula we let prime(n) be the nth prime, where prime(0) = 2, prime(1) = 3, . . . . Importantly to the combinatorics of the diagonalization below in this proof, any odd prime raised to a power is odd, and we noted before the statement of the present theorem being proved (Theorem 2.21) that our particular infinite padding function pad always outputs even numbers.
otherwise. For each p, q,
the first value v, if any, found by iteratively applying pad to ϕ c ( p, q ) such that:
and, for r, s = v,
As we'll see, ϕ-program w, spelled out next, is such that ϕ w = ζ w (Claim 2.29 below), and it computes the m = 1 case control structure of composition from [28, Lemma 3.10 ] (see Footnote 8 above) -but for the ζ-system (Claim 2.32). This w rewrites the output of w ′ above so that the resultant ζ-system composition will have strong associativity properties at the ζ-program code number level: let comp 1 = ζ w ; then for all ζ-programs a, b, c, the ζ-program number comp 1 (comp 1 (a, b) , c) will be the same ζ-program number as comp 1 (a, comp 1 (b, c) ). This strong property is, in effect, further developed in Claims 2.34 through 2.37, these claims put limits on the nature of unequal ζ-program numbers in ρ(comp 1 ) -so they cannot interfere with the unprovability part of Theorem 2.21, and, then, they are used in proving the difficult to prove Claim 2.40. This latter claim provides most of the desired unprovability -with Claim 2.41 finishing it off.
For each p, q,
then select minimum such s and, then, select the minimum r corresponding to this s;
(2.42) Claim 2. 22 . PA proves ≪ ϕ c is total ≫.
Proof of Claim 2. 22 . In general proofs of recursion theorems, especially including Lemma 2.20 above, are so simple that their proofs can be carried out in PA (albeit tediously). Claim 2.22
Proof of Claim 2. 23 . This follows directly from (2.41).
Claim 2.23
Claim 2. 24 . ϕ w ′ is total, and PA proves that.
Proof of Claim 2. 24 . Assume for induction that for arbitrarily-fixed p, q , for all x < p, q , we have ϕ w ′ (x)↓. By Claim 2. 
Thus, by induction, ϕ w ′ is total. The above inductive proof is accessible to PA, thus PA proves it.
Claim 2.24
Claim 2. 25 . ρ(ϕ w ) ⊆ ρ(ϕ w ′ ). Furthermore, PA proves this.
Proof of Claim 2. 25 . For each input x, exactly one of the three clauses of (2.42) must hold. If the first clause holds, then whatever value ϕ w (x) has must be a value that was in the range of ϕ w on some other input; by implicit application of Lemma 1.1, this recursion must bottom out at some value, and that value must come from some other clause. If the second clause holds, then ϕ w (x) = ϕ w ′ (x), and thus is a value in the range of ϕ w ′ . Lastly, if the third clause holds, then ϕ w (x)↑, and no value is added to the range of ϕ w . Thus, all values in the range of ϕ w have some x such that the second clause of (2.42) holds for ϕ w (x), and therefore, the range of ϕ w is a (potentially proper) subset of the range of ϕ w ′ . PA can handle the preceding argument. Claim 2.25
Proof of Claim 2. 26 . Fix arbitrary q, assume that q ∈ ρ(ϕ w ). Per the proof of Claim 2.25 and the second clause of (2.42), there then exists x such that ϕ w (x) = q = ϕ w ′ (x). By Claims 2.23 and 2.24, for x such that ϕ w ′ (x) = q, it must be the case that x ≤ q. By (2.41), x = q. Thus, (∃x < q)[ϕ w (x) = q]; as this follows from the assumption that q ∈ ρ(ϕ w ), it therefore follows that if q ∈ ρ(ϕ w ), (∃x < q)[ϕ w (x) = q]. This proves the claim except for the part about PA. 
Then, by (2.41), it follows that
and thus, by substitution, it follows that p > ϕ w ( r, r ′ ), s ′ ; this contradicts
Case three: The third clause of (2.42) holds for input ϕ w ( r, r ′ ), s ′ ; this contradicts ϕ w ( r, s )↓ = p. All cases lead to a contradiction; therefore, the claim holds.
Claim 2.27
Claim 2. 28 . ϕ w is total; furthermore, PA proves this.
Proof of Claim 2. 28 . Assume for induction that for arbitrarily-fixed p, q , for all x < p, q , ϕ w (x)↓. It follows from inequalities about pairing (Lemma 1.1) and the induction assumption that (∀ r, s < q)[ϕ w ( r, s )↓]. Thus, for input p, q , the first clause of (2.42) holds if (∃ r, s < q)[q = ϕ w ( r, s )] and the second clause of (2.42) holds if (¬∃ r, s < q)[q = ϕ w ( r, s )]; thus, the third clause of (2.42) does not hold for input p, q . If the second clause of (2.42) holds for input p, q , then by Claim 2.24, ϕ w ( p, q )↓. If the first clause of (2.42) holds for input p, q , then
where r, s < q, q = ϕ w ( r, s ), s is minimum such that that is the case, and r is minimum corresponding to s. It follows that both r < q and s < q. From the fact that r < q, it follows that ϕ w ( p, r )↓ by the inductive assumption. As s < q, and s ∈ ρ(ϕ w ) (by Claim 2.27), it then follows from the induction hypothesis that (∀ r ′ , s ′ < s)[ϕ w ( r ′ , s ′ )↓ = s]; thus, the second clause of (2.42) holds for ϕ w ( ϕ w ( p, r ), s ), which is therefore defined by Claim 2. 24 . From the inductive assumption, then, ϕ w ( p, q )↓. By induction, ϕ w is total. PA can prove this as well.
Claim 2.28
Claim 2. 29 . ζ w = ϕ w , and PA proves this.
Proof of Claim 2. 29 . The equality follows immediately from the first disjunct of the disjunction in the first clause of (2.39); PA can prove this as well. In the remainder of this proof, we will need the ability to treat programs in the range of ϕ w -which are now known to be compositions of other programs -as a sequence of such compositions. Furthermore, we need the ability to take potentially-long such sequences and pull off a single element from the front or back, and recompose the rest of the sequence to get another ζ-program. In order to do this, we introduce chain and unchain; chain takes the code number of a ζ-program and outputs a sequence of ζ-programs such that if the sequence is composed in order, the computed partial function is equivalent to the partial function computed by the input ζ-program; while unchain takes a non-empty sequence of ζ-programs and outputs a single ζ-program which is equivalent to composing the sequence in order. Proof of Claim 2.34. Let x be an arbitrary value, and assume for induction that for all y < x, the claim holds for chain(y). Case one: chain(x) = x. It immediately follows that the claim holds for chain(x) in this case. Case two: chain(x) = chain(p), q. Then ϕ w ( p, q ) = x, x > p, and x > q.
Then p and q are such that the second clause of (2.42) holds on input p, q , per Claim 2. 27 . Then x = ϕ w ′ ( p, q ), from which it follows that ϕ x = ζ p • ζ q . Furthermore, since x is in the range of ϕ w , ζ x = ϕ x by the second disjunct of the first clause of (2.39). From the just previous reasoning and the induction assumption, the claim also holds for chain(x) in this case. By the induction, the claim holds for all x. Claim 2.34
Claim 2.35. For any p, none of the elements of chain(p) are in ρ(ϕ w ).
Proof of Claim 2.35. Assume by induction that for all p ′ < p, the elements of chain(p ′ ) are each not in ρ(ϕ w ).
Case one: The first clause of (2.43) holds for p. Let r, s be per that clause; by Lemma 1.1, it follows that r < p. Therefore, by the induction assumption, the elements of chain(r) are each not in ρ(ϕ w ). By Claim 2.27, s is also not in ρ(ϕ w ); thus, each element of chain(p) is not in ρ(ϕ w ). Case two: The second clause of (2.43) holds for p. By Claim 2.26, if p is in the range of ϕ w , then (∃ r, s < p)[ϕ w ( r, s )↓ = p]; thus, p ∈ ρ(ϕ w ), and the only element of chain(p) is not in ρ(ϕ w ). By induction, the claim holds for all p.
Claim 2.35
Claim 2.36. For all x, unchain(chain(x)) = x.
